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This paper analyzes the founding rate of bioengineering departments in the United 
States. It takes the density dependence model from organizational ecology literature as 
the starting point of the analysis. This model predicts that founding rates of 
organizational populations are driven by population density, which represents processes 
of legitimation and competition, and by external environmental factors. The analysis 
finds support for density dependence predictions about the effect of population density on 
the founding rate of bioengineering departments. Further, this analysis finds that funding 
from the Whitaker Foundation has a significant positive impact on the founding rate of 
departments. The density dependence model is based on assumptions that individual 
actors  are limited in their ability to act strategically and that competition is diffuse. In 
light of these assumptions and the threat to validity that would be posed if they were 
incorrect, the paper presents a discussion of strategic interaction and direct competition. I 
use an acceleration analysis comparison to conduct an initial study of the existence of 
endogenous interaction within the population of bioengineering departments. I find 












The biotechnology industry is characterized by a high level of interdependence 
between organizations. The nature of the industry is such that no single organization has 
access to or control over all the relevant capabilities. Studies have found the presence of 
local universities and star scientists (Zucker et al, 1998) and the density of local 
biotechnology-relevant degree programs (Stuart and Sorenson, 2003) to be significant in 
determining the establishment of local biotechnology firms. Owen-Smith and Powell note 
that the field of biotechnology “had its origins in university labs, where research was 
supported by decades of substantial government investment in R&D” (2004: 8). The 
importance of universities as a source of research and human capital is acknowledged in 
the literature, but there has been little study of the establishment of biotechnology-related 
university departments or programs. 
This paper studies bioengineering departments, a population of university 
departments that is closely related to the biotechnology industry. Bioengineering is a 
broad term that includes both biological and biomedical engineering. Though studies of 
biotechnology firm foundings have considered reasons for the emergence of 
biotechnology firms in particular locations, the question that this paper addresses is not 
focused on specific locations or subpopulations. Instead, this paper addresses the 
questions of how bioengineering departments emerged as a population and why the 
founding rate of the population exhibits a certain pattern. 
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Organizational ecology is a useful framework for studying the population of 
bioengineering departments. Organizational ecology is a strand of literature within 
organizational theory that shifts the level of analysis from individual organizations to a 
population of organizations. This shift is a result of the observation that individual 
organizations are subject to strong inertia that constrains their ability to change or adapt. 
Organizational ecologists suggest that the organizational environment selects individual 
organizations. 
Population ecology was launched with the question, “Why are there so many 
kinds of organizations?” (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Most of the research that has been 
conducted since this time has focused on a slightly different question, “Why does the 
number of organizations of a given kind vary over time?” (Carroll and Swaminathan, 
1991; Carroll et al, 1993). Population ecologists have studied how and why populations 
of organizations emerge, change, and decline by studying vital rates: rates of founding, 
growth, and failure. The main interest is how these rates are influenced by intra-
population dynamics and environmental conditions. 
Organizational ecologists have drawn on institutional theory, which has a broader 
conception of organizational environment, to expand population ecology theory and 
research. The theory of density dependence is at the root of the use of institutional 
insights in ecological work, and has remained central to population ecology research. 
Population ecology research continues to use and test the theory of density dependence, 
and the theory has been expanded, as empirical studies show weaknesses of the theory’s 
predictions. In particular, population ecology theorists have sought to modify and add to 
density dependence models in relation to mature populations. Mature organizational 
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populations often exhibit patterns of growth and decline after the initial peak predicted by 
density dependence. This has led to theories of mass dependence, density delay, and 
temporal heterogeneity. 
Density dependence theory has been expanded by the prediction that processes of 
competition and legitimation differ by geographic level. Researchers study the effects of 
legitimation and competition processes at different geographic levels of a population. 
Density dependence research has divided populations of organizations into sub-
populations in order to study the effect of institutional variables that differ by political 
boundaries. 
In addition to studying the intra-population density dynamics of one population – 
either vertically, at different levels of geographic aggregation, or horizontally, by 
comparing localities – density dependence theory has expanded by considering inter-
population density dynamics. The premise is that populations of organizations may be 
distinct populations in terms of resource space and organizational form, but functionally 
complementary. Interpopulation dependence is often studied in relation to high-tech 
industries that share a technological and knowledge base. 
The biotechnology industry is one that is characterized by a high level of 
interpopulation dependence. Bioengineering departments are an important population 
within this community, but one that has not received much attention. This paper intends 
to address this gap. The emergence and growth of the bioengineering department 
population is studied, first, in relation to the intra-population dynamics of legitimacy and 
competition through density dependence theory. The paper also considers an alternative 
explanation for the growth of bioengineering departments. The alternative explanation 
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predicts that the universities that establish bioengineering departments are engaged in 
strategic interaction that has a significant effect on the pattern of adoption of departments. 
The hope is that study of the effect of intra-population dynamics and institutional 
environment on the founding rate of bioengineering departments will provide a basis for 
further study of interactions within the population of bioengineering departments as well 
as interactions between the population of bioengineering departments and other actors in 








2.1 Foundation for Population Ecology Research 
 
Hannan and Freeman (1977) established a framework for the population ecology 
research agenda with a seminal work that argued for an ecological approach to 
understanding the effects of organizational environment. Ecological research is 
characterized by its focus on selection processes. Hannan and Freeman (1977) argued 
that organization theory was overly focused on the adaptation of individual organizations. 
They do not claim that individual adaptation does not take place. Rather, they suggest 
that internal and external constraints limit individual organizational adaptation, and 
hypothesize that organizational variability is a result of competition and selection. 
Hannan and Freeman’s reasoning about environmental selection entails not only a 
shift from an adaptation to a selection perspective, but it also entails a shift in unit of 
analysis from an individual organization and its environment to a population of 
organizations and a shared environment. In defining population, Hannan and Freeman 
begin with the idea that a population is characterized by organizations that respond 
similarly to changes in the environment, or, that “are relatively homogenous in terms of 
environmental vulnerability” (1977: 934). They expand upon this definition to include the 
concept of organizational form, which relates to a common blueprint for action, a 
framework that structures how organizations receive, process, and act upon information.  
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The focus on selection and the shift to the population-level unit of analysis have a 
purpose, and as Hannan and Freeman explain, this purpose is to “understand the 
distributions of organizations across environmental conditions and the limitations on 
organizational structures in different environments” (1977: 936).  To look at the 
relationship between distribution of organizations and environments, they emphasize the 
importance of isomorphism and competition. 
Isomorphism is the observation that organizations facing the same constraints will 
resemble each other in structure and strategy. Within population ecology, there is an 
important assumption that isomorphism is a result of environmental selection – it is the 
environment that determines organizational form and distribution. Environmental 
selection works through the process of competition for scarce resources. As Hannan and 
Freeman write, “organizational forms presumably fail to flourish in certain environments 
because other forms successfully compete with them for essential resources” (1977: 940). 
Population ecology is a term that is often confused with the broader term 
organizational ecology, which is simply the application of an ecological approach to the 
study of organizational populations (Carroll, 1984; Nunez-Nickel and Moyano-Fuentes, 
2006).  Population ecology is one of three levels of analysis within organizational 
ecology, the others being organizational demography and community ecology. 
Population ecology is distinguished from the other levels both by its selection approach 
and by its interest in the growth and decline of populations of organizations. Population 
ecology also includes the study of interactions between populations of organizations. All 
three levels of research within organizational ecology examine the vital rates of 
organizational populations: foundings, growth and decline, and deaths. Carroll explains 
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that population ecology research differs from organizational demography when “an 
independent variable interacts organizational form with environmental condition” (1984: 
85). Community ecology retains the interest in organizational form and studies the 
emergence and disappearance of forms rather than of specific populations. 
Both theoretical and empirical organizational ecology research has been 
conducted at all three levels, which has resulted in a large amount of literature. This 
literature review will give a broad overview of much of the literature, with a specific 
focus on the research that has analyzed founding rates in organizational populations. 
 
2.2 Early Population Ecology Research 
 
Early work within population ecology focuses on the study of structural inertia, 
organizational niches, and resource partitioning. Hannan and Freeman (1984) build on 
their earlier work by studying inertial force in greater depth, questioning the strength of 
inertial forces on organizational structure. They relate the concept of structural inertia to 
vital rates within populations, arguing that selection favors organizations whose 
structures have high structural inertia, structural inertia increases with age, organizational 
death rates increase with age, attempts at reorganization increase death rates, and 
complexity increases the risk of death due to reorganization (Hannan and Freeman, 
1984). 
Freeman and Hannan (1983) also extend their work by studying organizational 
niches in more detail. An organizational niche is a resource space that supports a specific 
population. The concept of niche width is defined as “a population’s tolerance for 
changing levels of resources, its ability to resist competitors, and its response to other 
factors that inhibit growth” (Freeman and Hannan, 1983: 1118). Though the concept of 
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niche width is introduced in their earlier work, Freeman and Hannan (1983) predict the 
effect of niche width on failure rates of organizational populations. The level of 
environmental variability and the pattern (or, grain) of variability determine niche width. 
Course-grained niches are characterized by less frequent variability than are fine-grained 
niches. Freeman and Hannan (1983) find evidence that niche width affects failure rates 
within organizational populations, and that through this effect, niche width has an effect 
on the relative distribution of specialist and generalist organizations within a population. 
Niche width became a significant area of research in early population ecology 
literature. The initial focus of this research was on the distribution of specialist and 
generalist organizations within a population (Carroll, 1985), but the concept of niche also 
became an important method of conceptualizing heterogeneity within population. The 
study of organizational niches also provided a unique method for studying of two types of 
interdependence, competition and mutualism, within an organizational population (Baum 
and Singh, 1994). 
An early study by Delacroix and Carroll (1983) has shaped the study of founding 
rates within organizational ecology. They note that until that point, study of founding 
rates had largely been avoided within organizational ecology studies due to the 
impossibility of defining the risk set at an individual level. Analysis of failure rates is 
able to consider an individual organization as the unit of analysis (though the population 
remains the level of analysis), but analysis of founding rates must use the population as 
both the level and unit of analysis. This restricts the amount of information that can be 
used in the analysis of founding rates; in sum, “since there is not organization prior to 
founding, organizational attributes cannot be used as independent variables” (Delacroix 
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and Carroll, 1983: 275). They suggest the use of a level of environment to define a 
population as the unit of analysis; possible levels include neighborhood, region, or 
nation-state. This method of analyzing the population initially expanded the study of 
founding rates, and later inspired research that has sought to address the disadvantage of 
population-level analysis, which is the implicit assumption that organizations within the 
population are homogenous. 
In a study of populations of newspapers in Argentina and Ireland, Delacroix and 
Carroll (1983) model the effects of both intra-population dynamics and institutional 
environmental variables on the founding rate of newspapers. They include ecological 
variables in their analysis by relating prior organizational births and deaths in the 
population to current births. They expect the effect of both prior births and prior deaths to 
be curvilinear and the combination of the effects to generate a cyclical process of 
organizational births. They also consider several socio-political environmental factors in 
their analysis, including political turbulence, election year, economic prosperity, and 
business cycles. They find the expected relationship between prior births and deaths to be 
curvilinear as expected, but find political turbulence to be the best predictor of current 
newspaper foundings. 
Thus, this study (Delacroix and Carroll, 1983) was important both because it 
prompted study of organizational foundings at the population level, but also because it 
identified important population-level variables to be used in such analysis. 
 
2.3 Early Critiques of Population Ecology 
 
Early criticism of population ecology research focused on “the supposedly 
deterministic nature of ecological ideas, the lack of attention to adaptation and change, 
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[and] the nature of the key constructs and the units of study” (Singh and Lumsden, 1990: 
184). These criticisms and the responses of population ecologists are a fitting transition 
between early research, which establishes the fundamental approach and concepts used in 
population ecology, and the subsequent stage of research, which emphasizes the 
convergence of population ecology and institutional theory. 
The first two criticisms are closely related. Criticism that population ecology 
research is deterministic is based on claims that population ecology ignores the role of 
managers within organizations and dismisses adaptive decisions and learning of 
individual organizations (Astley and Van de Ven, 1983). As noted earlier, in their article 
on population ecology, Hannan and Freeman (1977) do not deny that adaptation takes 
place or that individual leaders within organizations can affect organizational outcomes, 
they simply claim that selection is the stronger process, and that it warrants study by 
organizational theorists. 
Young (1988) takes issue with the constructs used in population ecology research, 
and this criticism is the third and final critique to be considered in relation to early 
ecological research. Young makes the following claims about population ecology: 
 
 concepts developed for biology are often difficult to apply to organizations, 
 reasoning is sometimes questionable, new hypotheses developed for organizations 
 do not seem to be derived or to benefit form biological theory, and empirical 
 support is lacking (1988: 1). 
 
Most of these claims are related to the relationship between organizational ecology and 
its biological ecology antecedent. Organizational ecologists respond to Young’s critique 
by claiming that she is too literal (Brittain and Wholey, 1989; Freeman and Hannan, 
1989). Freeman and Hannan emphasize that Young’s critique “takes as its premise the 
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incorrect view that we have attempted to reduce organizational processes to biological 
ones, that we seek a mapping between organizational and biotic worlds” (1989: 426). 
Similarly, Brittain and Wholey claim that “Young’s criticisms of ecological theory 
unravel when the theory is evaluated in sociological rather than biological terms” (1989: 
440).  
 
2.4 Density Dependence 
 
A significant development in organizational ecology research is the use of 
population density as variable of interest in studying the effect of intra-population 
ecological dynamics on vital rates of the population. Though density has been used to 
model dynamics such as competition and mutualism (Barnett and Carroll, 1987), it has 
been most extensively applied through the model of density dependence. 
The model of density dependence predicts that the relationship between the 
number of organizations in a population (population density) and the rate of founding of 
new organizations in the population is non-monotonic. The non-monotonic relationship is 
explained in terms of legitimacy and competition. At low levels of density, founding rates 
rise as population density increases because each additional organization increases the 
legitimacy, or the “taken-for-grantedness”, of the population (Hannan and Freeman, 
1987). As population density continues to increase, the need for legitimacy declines, and 
competition becomes the dominant process. At high levels of density, resources are 
expected to be scarce and competition for these scarce resources has a negative effect on 
the founding rate of organizations in the population (Hannan and Freeman, 1987; Carroll 
and Hannan, 1989). 
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The density dependence model also makes predictions about the effect of 
population density on morality rates. Morality rates are expected to be low when 
population density is low and resources are abundant; they are expected to be high when 
population density is high and resources are scarce (Carroll and Hannan, 1989).  Early 
empirical work by Carroll and Hannan (1989) found the predictions about founding rates 
to hold in relation to founding rates in populations of newspapers, but the predictions 
about failure rates only held in large populations. 
There is large body of work that has been devoted to testing the predictions of 
density dependence in various populations of organizations. Before considering the 
results of these studies, it is important to review in more depth the meanings of 
legitimacy and competition that are used in relation to density dependence. 
Hannan and Carroll (1992) explain that the theory of density dependence is 
unique not in its conception of legitimacy or competition, but in its combination of 
assumptions about legitimacy and competition with population density. Direct measures 
of competition and legitimacy are often unavailable; density dependence theory suggests 
that at a general level, population density is a useful proxy for these processes as it is a 
driver of both competition and legitimacy in organizational populations. Hannan and 
Carroll (1992) emphasize that density is not an indicator in the sense that it reflects the 
processes of competition and legitimacy; rather, they argue that density is an indicator 
because, in a more direct sense, density controls the processes of competition and 
legitimacy. 
Density dependence theory draws assumptions about the nature of competition 
within an organizational population from human ecology, in which competition is 
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assumed to be diffuse and indirect (Hawley, 1944). Competition is a process by which 
organizations compete for similar resources; it is assumed to be indirect because the 
process or dynamic exists regardless of whether organizations are aware of the number or 
identity of the other organizations that occupy the same resource space (Hannan and 
Carroll, 1992). This conception of competition is based on the assumption that a finite 
carrying capacity exists for the population and is set by environmental conditions. 
Density is assumed to be positively related to diffuse competition; competition will 
become more intense as the number of organizations in a population increases and seeks 
to draw from the same finite resource space. As competition increases, founding rates are 
expected to decline. 
Density dependence theory emphasizes legitimacy as a norm-based state of taken-
for-grantedness (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1983) over an understanding 
of legitimacy as coercive institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), which 
is based on legality or rules. The understanding of legitimacy as taken-for-grantedness is 
referred to as constitutive legitimacy (Carroll and Hannan, 2000). This conception of 
legitimacy is taken from institutional theory, and represents the beginning of efforts to 
use insights from institutional theory in ecological research. It is important to distinguish 
this use of theoretical concepts (especially in relation to legitimacy) derived from 
institutional theory from the use of institutional environmental variables, such as political 
turbulence, which had been used in ecological research (Delacroix and Carroll, 1983; 
Carroll and Huo, 1986) before the development of the density dependence model. 
Density is assumed to be positively related to legitimacy; as the number of 
organizations in a population increases, each additional organization is assumed to 
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contribute to constitutive legitimacy. There is a point, however, when legitimacy reaches 
a ceiling, the population is perceived as natural, and an additional organization does not 
add to the population’s legitimacy. Founding rates are expected to rise with legitimacy. 
The assumption that there is a fixed ceiling of constitutive legitimacy simplifies 
the expectation of the combined effect of competition and legitimacy on founding rates.  
Legitimacy is expected to have a stronger effect on founding rates at lower levels of 
density. Density dependence predicts that a population’s founding rate rises with 
legitimacy up to a certain point, at which the competition process becomes the stronger 
force. After this point, further increases in population density are expected to have a 
negative effect on founding rates. 
The theory of density dependence has been applied to a wide range of 
organizational populations, and the majority of studies have found the predicted density 
relationship to be significant for both founding and mortality rates (Singh and Lumsden, 
1990; Carroll and Hannan, 2000). Density dependence has been studied in the following 
populations, among others: automobile manufacturing (Hannan et al, 1995; Rao, 1994), 
beer brewing (Carroll et al, 1993), banks (Lomi, 2000), newspapers (Carroll and Hannan, 
1989), day care centers (Baum and Singh, 1994), hotels (Baum and Mezias, 1992; Ingram 
and Inman, 1996), and labor unions (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). 
In 1995, Baum and Powell examined density dependence articles that had been 
published in the previous five years and found that there is stronger support for density 
dependence predictions in relation to founding rates than in relation to failure rates.  They 
also found that support for density dependence is stronger in populations that have just 
passed their peak density than in populations in which information for a longer period of 
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time is available and which have experienced decline after the density peaks (Baum and 
Powell, 1995). 
Over time, more evidence has emerged that density dependence predictions do not 
hold as well in mature populations (Ruef, 2004; Lomi et al, 2005). Density dependence 
predicts population dynamics well until the point after which the population has reached 
its peak density. The evolution of organizational populations after this peak has become a 
new area of research for organizational ecology (Carroll, 1997; Carroll and Hannan, 
2000). 
Early efforts to develop a model to explain post-peak dynamics include mass 
dependence (Barnett and Amburgey, 1990) and density delay (Carroll and Hannan, 
1989). Density delay (Carroll and Hannan, 1989) predicts that the density of the 
population the year that an organization is born affects its probability of failure rate; 
organizations that are born in years when density is high face a more competitive 
environment at the time of founding, and thus, are expected to have a higher risk of 
failure. This model relates only to growth and failure rates; it does not make predictions 
about founding rates. Mass dependence (Barnett and Amburgey, 1990) makes predictions 
about founding and failure rates in an organizational population on the basis of 
population mass rather than population density. This model takes into account the 
possibility that larger organizations have a stronger (positive) effect the level of 
competition within a population than do smaller organizations. The model predicts that as 
mass increases, founding rates fall and failure rates rise. 
More recent efforts to explain post-peak dynamics include temporal heterogeneity 
(Hannan, 1997) and community dependence (Ruef, 2004; Lomi et al, 2005). Hannan 
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(1997) introduced the model of temporal heterogeneity, which predicts that the expected 
effects of legitimacy and competition depend not on population density, but on the 
interaction of population density and population age. The effects of both legitimacy and 
competition are expected to become less sensitive to density as the population ages. This 
model has been primarily applied to founding rates of organizational populations (Barron, 
2001; Dobrev, 2001; Wezel, 2005).  
Community ecology is an approach that emphasizes inter-population dynamics, 
and suggests that vital rates depend not only on intra-population dynamics but also on 
inter-population dynamics. Ruef claims that certain populations are best understood not 
in isolation but “in the context of a concrete system of interrelationships between 
organizational suppliers, consumers, regulators, and intermediaries” (2000: 660). There 
has been little empirical research in the area of community dynamics and relations 
between organizational populations, especially in relation to founding rates. 
Audia et al note that “the few studies that have examined the impact of multiple 
organizational populations on entrepreneurial activity have tended to focus on a small 
subset of populations that researchers assume a priori to be particularly influential” 
(2006). They cite studies by Zucker et al (1998) and Stuart and Sorenson (2003) as 
examples of research that has considered inter-population dynamics but that are limited 
by the focus on a small subset of populations. Audia et al (2006) combine an ecological 
approach that is focused on inter-population dynamics with network analysis to analyze 
the founding rates of instrument manufacturers in the United States. They find that 
foundings increase as the density of populations that have symbiotic and commensalistic 
relations with the population of instrument manufacturers increases. This is similar to 
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Baum and Oliver’s (1992, 1996) study of institutional embeddedness, which will be 
discussed in further detail in the following section on the convergence of ecology and 
institutionalism. 
Lomi et al (2005) introduce the concept of system-dependence. System 
dependence assumes that populations of organizations are able to influence their 
environment and, further, that their ability to influence the environment increases as the 
population ages. They argue that environments of organizational populations are 
endogenous and that resource constraints are dynamic. Dynamic resource constraints 
introduce the possibility that populations can overshoot the carrying capacity of the 
environment if there are delays in the response of organizational vital rates to changes in 
resource levels. Lomi et al (2005) present this model as an explanation for post-peak 
fluctuation in mature organizational populations, but do not test it empirically. 
This section of the literature review has focused on the theory of density 
dependence. Density dependence is an important model within organizational ecology, 
especially in explaining intra-population dynamics in young populations. Empirical 
research has shown density dependence to be less accurate in relation to mature 
organizational populations. Rather than negating research on density dependence, these 
empirical findings have inspired further work to expand the model of density 
dependence. This has led to theories of density delay, mass dependence, temporal 
heterogeneity, community dependence, and system dependence. The next section of the 
literature review considers a different aspect of density dependence research; namely, its 




2.5 Interaction of Ecological and Institutional Dynamics 
 
Early articles that develop the theory of density dependence present the theory as 
a convergence of institutional and ecological perspectives. In one of these early articles, 
Carroll and Hannan claim that their study of the density dependent processes of 
legitimation and competition “can be seen at a more general level as a synthesis of 
theoretical perspectives commonly held to be in opposition to each other” (1989: 525). 
Institutionalism, like organizational ecology, focuses on the importance of 
organizational environment, but has a broader and more detailed conception of what 
composes the environment. Research in organizational ecology tends to focus on 
resources and the competition for resources as the fundamental characteristics of 
organizational environments, whereas “institutional theorists broadened the framework to 
comprehend the role of regulative, normative, and cultural forces working to constrain 
and constitute organizations, organizational populations, and organizational fields” (Scott 
and Davis, 2006: 258). A widely cited definition of institutions describes them as being 
“composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together with 
associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life” (Scott, 
2001: 48). 
Density dependence theory draws on institutional theory that focuses on the 
cultural-cognitive aspects of institutions. Density dependence theory’s conception of 
legitimacy is derived specifically from Meyer (1983) and Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) 
conception of legitimacy as taken-for-grantedness (Hannan and Carroll, 1992). This 
understanding of legitimacy central to the cultural-cognitive conception of institutions, in 
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which the basis of legitimacy is that it is comprehensible, recognizable, and culturally 
supported (Scott and Davis, 2006: 259). 
Zucker (1989) critiques population ecologists’ use of cognitive-cultural 
legitimacy in density dependence theory. She criticizes the theory of density dependence 
for not directly measuring legitimacy and competition. She argues that there is 
insufficient evidence of a link between density and the processes of legitimacy and 
competition. She also suggests that the non-monotonic form is not necessarily a function 
of legitimacy or competition, but could be the result of an exogenous shock, such as “new 
inventions or major scientific discoveries” or “political and/or social changes” (Zucker, 
1989: 543). 
Baum and Oliver (1992) respond to Zucker’s critique that there should be more 
direct measures of institutional processes by introducing the concept of relational density. 
Relational density is introduced as a proxy for embeddedness in the institutional 
environment. They study a population of day care centers, and measure relational density 
as the number of purchase-of-service agreements (direct relationship with government) 
and the number of site-sharing arrangements (connectedness with social institutions). 
They predict that relational density is the source of the non-monotonic form. They study 
founding and failure rates and find evidence to support their predictions; when relational 
density is included as a variable, the legitimating effects of increases in population 
density are no longer significant, but competitive effects remain significant. 
In comment on Hannan et al (1995), Baum and Powell (1995) make a further 
criticism of population ecology’s use of the concept of legitimacy. They argue that 
Hannan et al (1995) treat density as a process when they feel that it is better understood 
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as a proxy for relational or cognitive density. They also criticize Hannan et al (1995) for 
exclusive emphasis on cognitive dimension of legitimacy to exclusion of socio-political 
legitimacy. 
Hannan and Carroll (1995) respond to this criticism, claiming to use both kinds of 
estimates (cognitive and socio-political) but to give greater emphasis to cognitive 
legitimacy. Their first reason for emphasizing cognitive legitimacy is because they 
consider the use of socio-political legitimacy variables to be “restat[ing] the obvious” 
(Hannan and Carroll, 1995: 540). The second reason they give for emphasizing cognitive 
legitimacy is methodological. They argue that institutionalists treat changes in the 
institutional environment as exogenous, when “dynamics of the organizational population 
frequently affect the timing and form of legislation and regulation” (540). The idea that 
population dynamics can result in institutional change is an approach to joining 
institutional and ecological perspectives, but it is an approach that is used much less than 
the study of how institutional variables affect vital rates of organizational populations 
(Singh and Lumsden, 1990). 
Research concerning the convergence of institutionalism and population ecology 
has continued to expand, mostly through the inclusion of variables that capture effects of 
institutional environment. Institutional environment is often studied in relation to the 
effect of institutions on legitimation and competition processes in populations. Density 
dependence is part of this line of research, as is work on institutional embeddedness. 
Baum and Oliver (1992) argue that institutional embeddedness, which they measure by 
relational density, confers legitimacy and resources. In later work, Baum and Singh 
(1994) and Baum and Oliver (1996) expand their work to consider competitive dynamics 
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within populations by introducing the concept of overlap density and non-overlap 
density. Baum and Oliver (1996) build on their institutional embeddedness research by 
drawing on the concept of organizational niche, and expanding it to include differences in 
competitive orientation and social legitimacy of organizations within the same 
population. Though Baum and Oliver’s work began by considering institutional effects 
related to density, it expanded to the study of competition dynamics as well. This trend is 
characteristic of the progression of research on the convergence of institutionalism and 
population ecology. 
Russo (2001) classifies research on institutional effects on competitive 
interactions into three categories: direct channeling of resources to organizations through 
policy making, ties between organizations and key institutions, and policy that constrains 
where and how organizations can compete. Effects of embeddedness have already been 
discussed. Direct channeling of resources occurs through favorable tax policies 
(Swaminathan, 1995), government subsidies (Tucker et al, 1990), and public 
capitalization (Dobbin and Dowd, 1997). Differences in regulative policy across states or 
regions (Carroll and Wade, 1991; Lomi, 1995; Wade et al, 1998) are a common area of 
study in relation to the effects of policy on determining where and how organizations 
compete. Dobbin and Dowd (1997) study direct competition policies, such as pro-cartel 
or anti-trust policies, and the effect on railroad foundings. Pro-cartel policies were found 
to increase foundings, while antitrust policies decreased foundings by raising the level of 
competition. 
The research on institutional effects on competitive interactions stays within 
organizational ecology’s use of the concept of competition to refer to indirect and diffuse 
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competition. This understanding of competition emphasizes that organizations compete 
because they require the same resources. It does not consider the possibility that 
organizations may compete directly, which  could involve each organization basing 
decisions on the actions of others organizations in the same population. These 
assumptions about the nature of competition between the organizations influence the type 
of policy that is expected to influence organizational populations: namely, policy that 
affects either the number of organizations allowed in a population (pro-cartel, anti-trust) 








3.1 Development of Biotechnology Industry 
 
Biotechnology is an industrial sector that has its beginnings in Watson and 
Crick’s work on DNA structure in the early 1950s. The industry expanded with the 
development of new knowledge in fields such as biochemistry and cell biology. Owen-
Smith and Powell claim that the industry “had its origin in university labs” and that it 
remains highly dependent on research conducted by public research organizations (2004: 
8). Biotechnology is also characterized by fairly small firms that conduct high levels of 
research and development. The actual work of biotechnology deals with the application 
of biological knowledge to molecular, cellular, and genetic processes; the design of new 
compounds; and the development of biological products and services (Malerba and 
Orsenigo, 2002; Cortright and Mayer, 2002).  
The academic discipline of bioengineering is relevant to biotechnology industry, 
as well as to pharmaceutical, medical device and implant, and tissue engineering 
industries. Bioengineering is defined as the application of engineering principles and 
methods to biology and human health. Research within bioengineering has primarily 
focused on biomedical engineering and medical applications, but agricultural and 
environmental research areas are also considered to be bioengineering. 
One way that bioengineering research contributes to biotechnology is through the 
development of new processes for manufacturing; an example is the manufacturing of 
human insulin, “the first product based on recombinant DNA technology, where 
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bioengineering was critical to the ability to commercialize the product” (National 
Institutes of Health, 1993). 
3.2 Emergence of Bioengineering Departments 
 
The academic field of bioengineering has its roots in the expansion of biological 
knowledge and research of the 1950s. Education and research programs in bioengineering 
began to be formed in the 1960s, and the first bioengineering departments in the United 
States were established in the early 1970s. 
University research in the area of bioengineering was conducted as early as the 
late 1940s at the University of Pennsylvania. The first programs in bioengineering were 
established in the 1950s at four universities: University of California at Berkeley and San 
Francisco, University of Pennsylvania, Iowa State University, and Drexel University. The 
term “biomedical engineering” was established in the late 1960s. Before this term was 
established, research in this area was described as “medical electronics” or “engineering 
in medicine and biology” (Nebeker, 2002). The term “bioengineering” also emerged in 
the late 1960s but was not commonly used at that time. Bioengineering is now 
understood to be a broader term that includes biomedical engineering as well as other 
bio-focused engineering areas. 
The number of bioengineering programs grew from 40 programs in 1965 to 180 
in 1971. The first two bioengineering departments were established in 1968, at Case 
Western University and the University of Virginia. Four more departments were 










 The Whitaker Foundation, a private sponsor of bioengineering research and 
education, was established in 1975. For the first few decades of its existence, the 
Whitaker Foundation “spent about 10% of its capital annually (about $14 million) mostly 
in 3-to-4 year grants to young faculty members” (Grimm, 2006). In 1991, the board of the 
Whitaker Foundation decided to spend out the entire endowment, as the U.A. Whitaker 
had not intended the foundation to last more than 40 years, and “because the board 
wanted to increase the impact of the foundation when the field was at the cusp of 
becoming mainstream” (Grimm, 2006). In addition to providing grants to individuals for 
research, the Whitaker Foundation began to award universities grants to establish 
bioengineering departments. 
 In an article about the emergence of bioengineering departments, Robert Nerem, 
chair of the Bioengineering Department at the Georgia Institute of Technology makes the 
following argument about the impact of the Whitaker Foundation on the emergence of 
bioengineering departments: 
Why are these new initiatives appearing? Some say a major factor is the Whitaker 
Foundation, located in Arlington, Virginia, and dedicated to the support of 
biomedical engineering. However, what these institutions are doing is responding 
to student interest, to the emergence of new industries, and to the exciting new 
engineering problems posed by developments in biology. The support of the 
Whitaker Foundation has been and will continue to be important; however, these 
institutions are investing resources of their own, which in many cases are far in 
excess of the support they are receiving from external sources (1997). 
 
This argument is interesting because it claims that though the Whitaker Foundation had 
an impact on the emergence of bioengineering departments, there were less direct 
elements of the institutional environment that were as important as support by the 
Whitaker Foundation. 
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3.3 Changes in Institutional Environment of Bioengineering Departments 
 
 There are two important institutional changes to consider in relation to the 
environment of bioengineering departments: first, the increasing government support for 
university biomedical research through the National Institutes of Health and, second, an 
increasing trend of university commercialization of research. 
  National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding has grown over the decades with 
increasing public concern about health care. During the 1950s, appropriations for the NIH 
“increased from $52 million to $430 million” (Nebeker, 2002). More recently, the NIH 
budget doubled between 1998 and 2003. During the 1960s, the NIH introduced a 
program to promote the introduction of engineering into biomedical research, and created 
training programs and a research base for biomedical engineering. The NIH did not have 
an institute or center devoted to bioengineering until 2001, however. In 1993, an External 
Consultants Committee produced a report for the NIH, recommending that the NIH 
establish a central focus for biomedical engineering, increase bioengineering presence on 
peer review committees, and establish new research programs targeted at bioengineering 
research. The NIH did not establish a central focus for biomedical engineering until 
December 2000, when the National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering 
(NIBIB) was established.  
  In the early 1980s, there was a policy effort in the United States to increase 
patenting and commercialization activity by universities in order to increase university 
contributions to economic growth. The Bayh-Dole Act, which was passed in 1980, 
formalized university intellectual property rights by introducing standard rules for the 
ownership of academic intellectual property that had been generated with federal research 
 28 
support (Owen-Smith, 2003). Policy to encourage technology diffusion is especially 
relevant to engineering disciplines like bioengineering, which we have already seen has 









4.1 Research Question and Hypotheses 
 
The research question and hypotheses presented in this section are motivated by 
the convergence of ecological and institutional research. The institutional factors 
considered in the analysis are motivated by the history of the emergence of 
bioengineering departments. The questions this analysis will address are: Are ecological 
dynamics, specifically density dependence, significant in explaining founding rates in 
bioengineering departments in the United States? And, if they are significant, do they 
remain significant when institutional variables have been included in the model? 
 
Ecological Effects on Founding 
Hypothesis 1: Population density has a non-monotonic effect on founding rates of 
bioengineering departments; the first order effect of density is expected to be positive, 
and the second order effect is expected to be negative. 
 Hypothesis 1 is based on the theory of density dependence, which predicts that 
density drives processes of legitimation and competition. Legitimacy rises with the 
number of organizations in a population and encourages foundings. Due to resource 
constraints, at a certain point competition will become the dominant process within the 
population. At this point, competition rises with the number of organizations in the 
population and discourages foundings. 
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 The theory of density dependence has been extended to consider density at 
different geographic levels, based on the assumption that legitimacy and competition 
processes are localized in certain populations. This does not seem to be the case in 
relation to university departments, as departments compete for national level federal 
funding, and are more likely to be members of national associations (for example, the 
American Institute for Medical and Biomedical Engineering) than state associations. 
 Density dependence theory has also been expanded to address cycles that have 
been observed in mature organizational populations after the density-dependent peak has 
been passed. These theories, such as mass dependence and density delay, are more 
applicable to mature populations. The population of bioengineering departments is 
young; therefore, I do not consider more complex models of density dependence. 
 
Resource Effects on Founding 
Increases in resources are expected to have a positive effect on founding rates 
within populations of organizations. I test the effects of two different types of funding, 
both of which are expected to be significant in encouraging founding rates of 
bioengineering departments. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Private funding from the Whitaker Foundation has a positive effect on the 
founding rate of bioengineering departments. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Increases in government support for bioengineering research has a positive 
effect on the founding rate of bioengineering departments. 
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Regulatory Policy Effects on Founding 
 I consider policy that encourages university commercialization to be a type of 
regulatory institution; standardizing rules for competition in the academic market should 
increase the founding rate of departments that engage in research that can be transferred 
to industry and patented. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Policy that encourages universities to engage in commercialization, 
especially in the area of science and engineering, will have a positive effect on the 
founding rate of bioengineering departments. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that a policy that focuses on commercialization will impact 
in academic disciplines engaged in research with potential for industrial application, such 
as biotechnology. Commercialization policy is expected to have encouraged the growth 
of the bioengineering discipline, which resulted in formation of departments because this 
is the conventional organizational form within universities. 
 
4.2 Methods and Model 
Sample 
While population ecology research uses a variety of models to study the vital rates 
of organizational populations, there are two unifying methods of population ecology 
research. First, as the name suggests, population ecology research studies an entire 
population of organizations rather than a sample or sub-set of a population. Second, 
population ecology research follows the entire history of the organizational population. 
Exclusion of data on the formative years is problematic, especially in relation to density 
dependence theory, as strong effects of density are predicted during these years. 
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Based on history of bioengineering departments, it is apparent that there was a 
higher rate of foundings of programs, and that programs were also founded more quickly 
than departments. There is a reason that this paper focuses on departments rather than 
programs, and why it does not consider them to be part of the same population. 
Population ecology is applied to organizations, and, even if it could be argued that degree 
programs are organizations, programs do not have the same level of structural inertia that 
is characteristic of university departments. Programs are administered by faculty 
members in multiple departments, and are much less structured than departments. 
Population ecology is applied to organizations, and is most relevant to those that exhibit 
structural inertia. 
I limit my study of bioengineering departments to a study of the founding rates. 
At this point, there is no evidence of failures within the bioengineering department 
population. There two possible reasons for the lack of failure: the young age of the 
population and the stability of university departments as organizations. In the only 
population ecology study that I have found related to universities, Ruef (2004) studies 
medical schools and does find a high number of failures. Medical schools can be 
considered quite different in form than bioengineering departments, though both are 
academic institutions. If a bioengineering department were to fail, it would be more likely 
to “fail” through name change or merger. 
I test the hypotheses using times series data on the founding of biotechnology 








Department Foundings. The dependent variable of interest is the number of 
foundings of bioengineering departments per year. I collected data on the founding year 
of each department in the population of 84 bioengineering departments from the 




 Population Density. Population density is calculated as the total number of 
bioengineering departments that exist per year. There are no failures in the population of 
bioengineering departments; thus, population density is a function of the number of prior 
births. 
 Population Age. Population age is number of years since the first bioengineering 
department was founded. Population age is added as a control variable, in order to control 
for the possibility that density-dependence is a simply a reflection of progression of time. 
Cattani et al explain that population ageing could have a negative effect on founding 
rates: “a Darwinian perspective on evolution… assumes that it is more difficult to enter a 
mature than a young population” (2003: 673). 
 Whitaker Foundation Funding. Whitaker Funding is the total amount of money 
awarded through grants by the Whitaker Foundation by year between 1975 and 2005. 
Data on amount awarded by grant type (for example, to distinguish between grants for 
research and grants for founding departments) was not available for the complete time 
period; therefore, I use the aggregate amount. The Whitaker Foundation was established 
in 1975; therefore, the amount of funding per year before 1975 is zero. The source for 
total funding by year is a chart published in a 2006 Science article (Grimm). 
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 Government Funding. I measure government funding by the yearly amount of 
National Institutes of Health funding that is allocated to “not elsewhere classified” 
engineering research. “Not elsewhere classified” is a category that captures engineering 
research supported by the NIH that does not fall into the following seven categories: 
aeronautical engineering, astronautical engineering, chemical, civil, electrical, 
mechanical, and metallurgy & materials. It is reasonable to assume that bioengineering 
captures the research that is not included in the above categories. Furthermore, the values 
for amount of support for the seven specified categories are all zero for the duration of 
the data. 
 I obtained the data from a National Science Foundation (NSF) report on Federal 
Obligations for Research by Agency and Detailed Field of Science and Engineering 
between 1970 and 2002. The data range presented a problem because it does not quite 
cover the later years in the study. For the later years in the study, I obtained data on the 
yearly appropriation for the NIBIB, which was established in 2001. 
 I use data from the NIH to proxy the level of government resources available to 
bioengineering department because is the institute that has contributed the majority of 
federal research grants to the field of bioengineering (AIMBE, 2006). I lag the level of 
NIH funding, assuming that there is a perception delay.  
 Commercialization Policy. To study the effects of US policy encouraging 
university commercialization, I include a dummy variable for the Bayh-Dole Act. The 







 Because the dependent variable in this analysis is a count variable, I use a Poisson 
regression model. The Poisson model assumes that the mean of the expected event counts 
equals the mean. If this is not the case, the data is described as exhibiting overdispersion 
(the variance is significantly greater than mean), and a negative binomial model is 
preferred to Poisson. I test for overdispersion, and not finding significant evidence of 
overdispersion in the data, I use the Poisson model, which gives smaller standard errors. 
















Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the Poisson analysis 




Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Founding Analysis 
 
 
Variable            Mean    Std. Dev.        Density     Population      Whitaker       NIH           Bayh-Dole  
                                                                         Age              Funding        Funding 
Density             27.18       23.14            1.00     
Population        20.0         11.40            0.91          1.00    
Age 
Whitaker           23.15       25.76           0.94           0.93                  1.00 
Funding    
NIH                   88.11       89.12            0.87          0.83                  0.89              1.00 
Funding    
Bayh-Dole         0.64         0.49              0.62          0.83                  0.66              0.57                  1.00             
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 Table 4.2 shows Poisson models of the founding of bioengineering departments. 
Model 1 is the baseline model. It includes the density dependence variables and the 
control for population age. Model 1 shows support for Hypothesis 1 (Density 
Dependence). Density has a significantly positive first-order effect on foundings. The 
second-order effect of density is smaller than the first-order effect, but is negative, as the 
density dependence model predicts. Population age is also shown to be significant in this 




Table 4.2 Poisson Analysis of Bioengineering Department Founding 
 
 Model 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Density 0.274 0.179 0.163 0.168 
 (0.061)** (0.066)** (0.067)* (0.068)* 
Density
2
 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)* 
Population Age -0.197 -0.196 -0.197 -0.260 
 (0.061)** (0.056)** (0.056)** (0.078)** 
Whitaker 
Funding  
 0.043 0.047 0.055 
(in millions)  (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.019)** 
NIH Funding, t-
1 
  0.001 0.001 
(in millions)   (0.001) (0.001) 
Bayh-Dole Act    0.932 
    (0.793) 
Constant -0.636 0.176 0.369 0.672 
 (0.367) (0.441) (0.468) (0.518) 
Observations 39 39 38 38 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.33 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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 Model 2, which analyzes the effect of Whitaker funding on foundings, shows that 
as Whitaker funding increases, the number of bioengineering department foundings also 
increases significantly. The effects of density and population age remain significant in 
this model, and retain the same sign as in Model 1. The size of the coefficients on density 
and its square become smaller when Whitaker funding is introduced to the model. The 
goodness-of-fit of the model increases from Model 1 to Model 2. 
 Model 3 considers the effect of National Institutes of Health funding on the 
founding of bioengineering departments. The effect is positive, as expected, but is 
statistically insignificant and practically very small. Including NIH funding does not 
change the significance or direction of other variables; it also does not improve the fit of 
the model. Similarly, including the Bayh-Dole Act in Model 4 does not improve the fit of 
the model or introduce new significant information; the effects of density dependence and 
Whitaker funding remain significant. Bayh-Dole shows the expected coefficient sign, but 
is not significant in this model. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
Overall, these results provide strong support for the density dependence model 
and for the positive effect of Whitaker funding on the founding of bioengineering 
departments. There is evidence that the density dependence model holds in this 
population, and that density dependence effects are significant even after important 
elements of the institutional environment are included as controls. Density dependence is 
not explained away when the institutional variables are added, though controlling for 
institutional variables does reduce the magnitude of its impact. 
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Funding from the Whitaker Foundation is also significant across all models. The 
effect of funding from the Whitaker Foundation is interesting, because much of the 
funding was awarded not to sustain bioengineering research within departments, but with 
the specific purpose of founding departments. Actors within bioengineering assume that 
the Whitaker Foundation funded a process that was happening or that would happen 
anyway. As mentioned earlier, the Whitaker Foundation started investing significantly 
when the board noticed that the field was “at the cusp of becoming mainstream” (Grimm 
2006). Similarly, Nerem claims that the Whitaker Foundation played an important role, 
but that institutional factors were also significant. This paper did not find other 
institutional factors to be significant – it found that the main drivers of bioengineering 
department founding were intra-population dynamics and funding from the Whitaker 
Foundation. 
An interesting question that can be asked in relation to Whitaker Foundation 
funding is the extent to which it caused universities to simply rename research and 
educational programs that already existed, essentially giving an established structure to 
content that already existed, or whether it encouraged universities to establish these 
departments from the ground up, encouraging completely new research and programs. In 
the first case, if universities are simply renaming research that already exists, forming a 
department simply gives the population more structural inertia, and perhaps, greater 
weight in inter-population interactions. In the second case, the Whitaker Foundation 
could have encouraged the population of bioengineering departments to overshoot its 
resource environment. The Whitaker Foundation was primarily a source of resources for 
founding departments, not for sustaining them, and the Foundation has now closed. It is 
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not clear that sufficient resources exist for supporting the population of bioengineering 
departments; partial evidence of this is the insignificance of NIH funding in the model of 
department founding. The possibility that the Whitaker Foundation caused the population 
of bioengineering departments to overshoot its resource constraints will be an interesting 
area for further research. As the population ages, it is possible that the population will be 
able to interact with the environment to create new resource opportunities; such 
interaction is predicted by the system dependence model (Lomi et al, 2005). 
Neither NIH funding nor commercialization policy (Bayh-Dole) is found to be 
significant in the models tested. It is possible that the commercialization policy dummy 
variable is not significant because the introduction of the Bayh-Dole Act and the main 
drive towards university commercialization do not occur at the same time. Instead, the 
thrust for universities to become involved in commercialization may have occurred 
before the Bayh-Dole Act was passed. In fact, Mowery et al (2001) suggest that Bayh-
Dole accelerated university commercialization that was already taking place, and that the 
extent of this acceleration is not clear. 
Commercializable research is only one output of bioengineering departments. The 
primary output of university departments is students. The growth of bioengineering 
departments has implications for the labor market; as the number of bioengineering 
department grows, the number of graduates with degrees in bioengineering will also 
increase. On the one hand, it is possible that just as the departments could overshoot  
environmental resource constraints, they could also overshoot industry demand for 
graduates with bioengineering degrees. On the other, it has been claimed that 
bioengineering industry was born in university labs, and it is possible that generating 
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graduates with degrees in bioengineering will open new market opportunities. An 
important extension of the work presented in this paper would be to consider the inter-
population dynamics between bioengineering departments and biotechnology firms, as 








5.1 Critique of Density Dependence Concept of Competition 
Part of the appeal of the density dependence model is its simplicity and its clarity 
of concepts, but it has been criticized for being “just too simple a story” (Geroski, 2000: 
616). While the concepts of competition and legitimacy are carefully defined and 
motivated, the definition of these concepts is quite limited. This poses a threat to the 
validity of empirical findings. It also provides opportunity for expansion of 
organizational ecology to consider broader definitions of competition and legitimacy. 
Considerable work has been done to expand the definition and operationalization 
of legitimacy in relation to organizational ecology and density dependence. Simple 
density dependence analysis is based on an understanding of legitimacy that is limited to 
cognitive legitimacy. Institutional theorists have done considerable research to expand 
the use of an expanded definition of legitimacy that includes sociopolitical legitimacy. 
The concept has been expanded to include alternative measures that account for 
sociopolitical legitimacy by operationalizing legitimacy not only as density but also as 
the relational embeddedness of actors. There has been comparatively little work done to 
critique and expand the conception of competition in organizational ecology. 
Density dependence is very clear its conception of competition as a diffuse and 
indirect process. This idea of competition is consistent throughout organizational 
ecology, though there have been recent efforts to expand the concept of competition to 
include direct competition (Witteloostuijn and Boone, 1997). In diffuse competition, 
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organizations within a population compete for a similar resource base. As the number of 
organizations in a limited resource space increases, indirect competition increases 
regardless of whether individual organizations are aware of the identity or exact number 
of their competitors. When competition is understood to be diffuse, the density of the 
population is an exogenous variable. If the concept of competition within organizational 
ecology is expanded to include direct competition, density may be found to be 
endogenous. 
An understanding of direct competition emphasizes that economic actors are not 
only aware of each other, but that they often act strategically to fight for market space. 
Organizational ecology does not consider direct competition, and it does not consider the 
possibility that organizations act strategically in founding decisions. I will consider 
strategic interaction between organizations more closely and consider whether there is 
evidence of strategic interaction in the population of bioengineering departments. 
Organizational ecology does not address strategic interactions between 
organizations in a population and their effects on population dynamics, but it does not 
completely dismiss the organization as a strategic actor either. Baum and Shipilov (2006) 
write the following to explain organizational ecology’s understanding of individual 
actors: 
Leaving aside whether their actions are intelligent or foolish, carefully planned or 
seat-of-the-pants, individuals can clearly influence their organization’s future – 
but under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity there are severe constraints on 
the ability of individuals to conceive and implement correctly changes that 
improve organizational success and survival chances reliably in the face of 
competition (58). 
 
They then quote Hannan and Freeman (1984) to emphasize the organizational ecology 
view that adaptive efforts by organizations have outcomes that are “essentially random 
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with respect to future value” (Baum and Shipilov, 2006: 58). Thus, the claim is not that 
organizations do not interact strategically or make strategic decisions; instead, it is simply 
that these strategic interactions have only a random or small impact on population 
dynamics such as founding, growth, and failure rates. I will consider the alternative: the 
possibility that strategic interactions have a systematic effect on population dynamics, 
specifically on the founding rate of bioengineering departments. 
 
5.2 Endogenous Interaction and Competition 
In making the decision to enter a market or adopt an innovation, strategic actors 
consider factors such as the cost and expected payoff of adoption. More importantly, 
strategic actors consider the expected adoption decisions of other actors in the same 
market space. It is not clear whether consideration of others’ adoption decisions would 
lead to early or late adoption in the case of universities adopting bioengineering 
departments. In the first case, that of Cournot competition, there is an incentive for 
universities to adopt early. Early entry allows actors to capitalize on early gains, since 
profits per actor will decline with the number of firms that enter (Geroski, 2000). By this 
reasoning, if a university expects other universities to adopt bioengineering departments, 
it will adopt early in order to obtain the greatest payoff in terms of both students and 
research grants. 
In the second case, in which knowledge spillovers exist, there is an incentive for 
universities to adopt later. In this case, universities wait until they are able to observe the 
success or failure of the early adopters. Those who adopt early provide a positive 
externality to those outside the market by making early investments and early mistakes 
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from which other universities are able to learn. Later adopters can then make more 
accurate decisions about whether entrance will be profitable. Both of these scenarios 
emphasize an actor that strategically considers the expected behavior of other actors in 
the population, but they come to different conclusions about the pattern of adoption in a 
population. In order to understand which of these patterns is closer to the pattern that is 
exhibited in the population of bioengineering departments, it is important to explore 
strategic interaction of organizations in greater depth and to acquire tools for the analysis 
of endogenous interaction. 
Witteloostuijn and Boone (1997) distinguish between endogenous and exogenous 
competition. Strategic competition is referred to as endogenous competition, which is 
described as “the result of increases in direct rivalry among firms within a population in 
the form of strategic moves” (17). Exogenous competition, on the other hand, is caused 
by changes in the environment, carrying capacity, and demand. Manski (2000) discusses 
social interactions rather than just competition and presents three hypotheses that 
empirical research has put forth to explain why actors belonging to the same population 
tend to behave similarly. Manski works from a framework of the economic analysis of 
social interactions, rather than from an organizational theory framework. The first 
hypothesis is endogenous interactions, which is Manski’s main focus as well as the most 
important for the current discussion. According to the endogenous interactions 
hypothesis, the propensity of an actor to behave in some way varies with the behavior of 
the group. The second hypothesis is that of contextual interactions, in which the behavior 
of the actor in some way varies with exogenous characteristics of group members. The 
third hypothesis, correlated effects, proposes that actors have a propensity to act similarly 
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to the group because the members of the group have similar characteristics or face similar 
institutional environments. Of these three hypotheses, only the endogenous interactions 
hypothesis implies feedback effects. 
Though these three hypotheses are simple to distinguish conceptually, it is 
difficult to empirically distinguish between the three types of effects based on outcome 
data. According to Manski, “data on outcomes do not reveal whether group behavior 
actually affects individual behavior, or group behavior is simply the aggregation of 
individual behaviors” (2000: 128). This is referred to as the identification problem. 
Manski suggests several methods for identification, or, for distinguishing whether 
exogenous interactions exist within a group. These include: observing the dynamics of a 
process in which individual behavior varies with lagged values of group mean behavior, 
supposing that individual behavior varies in a specified nonlinear manner with group 
mean or median behavior, and using an instrumental variable that affects the outcomes of 
some, but not all, group members. Each of these methods depends on the ability of the 
researcher to correctly identify group composition (Manski, 2000: 129). 
Before considering the identification of possible endogenous social interactions 
within the population of bioengineering departments, it worth mentioning another point 
that Manski makes. He writes that merely identifying endogenous interactions within a 
group is not helpful for purposes of policy intervention. In order to achieve effective 
policy intervention, it is important to distinguish between three types of endogenous 
interactions: constraint, preference, and expectations interactions (2000: 130). Constraint 
interactions occur when economic agents share a common resource. Preference 
interactions exist when an “agent’s preference ordering over the alternatives in a choice 
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set depends on the actions of others” (119). Finally, expectations interactions occur when 
an agent forms expectations by observing the actions and outcomes of other group 
members. Expectations interaction is a type of social learning. Manski explains the 
importance of distinguishing between preference and expectations interactions: policy 
“interventions that provide new information may alter the nature of expectations 
interactions… but should have no effect on preference interactions” (2000: 131). 
 
5.3 Pattern of Acceleration Analysis 
Instead of using one of Manski’s recommended methods for identifying 
endogenous interactions within a group, I turn to an article by Peyton Young that presents 
and compares the pattern of acceleration of different models of innovation diffusion. 
Different patterns of innovation diffusion are shown to have unique patterns of 
acceleration, which provides a simple method for drawing initial observations about the 
presence of endogenous interactions in the population of bioengineering departments. 
Young analyzes rates of innovation diffusion rather than the rate of innovation adoption, 
but it is simple to think of the founding of bioengineering departments as a process of 
innovation diffusion. It merely requires defining a larger population from which a certain 
proportion of universities have adopted bioengineering departments and others have not, 
at a specific time, t. Defining a larger population would pose a problem for firms, but 
bioengineering departments are likely to be founded only at universities and primarily at 
research-intensive universities. I define the larger population according to the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching classification of a group of universities as 
Doctoral/Research Universities-Extensive universities. There are alternative methods of 
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defining the larger population, but this is sufficient for the purpose of this paper, which is 
simply to compare the pattern of bioengineering department founding to Young’s models 
of innovation diffusion. 
Young (2007) presents five models of innovation diffusion: inertia, contagion, 
conformity, social learning, and moving equilibrium. Inertia is the simplest model; actors 
delay adoption until a revision opportunity occurs. In the contagion (or, epidemic) model, 
actors adopt an innovation when they hear about it from someone who has already 
adopted. Conformity (or, threshold) models explain innovation diffusion as a process by 
which people adopt and innovation when enough other people in the group have adopted 
the innovation. In the social learning model, actors adopt when they see enough evidence 
among prior adopters to convince them of the worth of the innovation. Finally, moving 
equilibrium models attribute the process of innovation diffusion primarily to changing 
external conditions. 
Young develops adoption functions for each of these models, and from the 
adoption function derives predictions about the rate of acceleration and the relative rate 
of acceleration of each model. He finds that “each family of models has a distinctive 
pattern of acceleration” and suggests that these patterns can be used to determine the type 
of heterogeneity that is driving a particular diffusion process (2007: 34). This is a useful 
method of conducting an initial analysis of endogenous interactions of a population. 
Three of the five models include feedback effects; these are the contagion, conformity, 
and social learning models. In the contagion model, individual organizations interact with 
other organizations in the population by hearing about innovations. There are two sources 
of information about innovations: sources within the group and/or sources external to the 
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group. The rate of innovation adoption depends on the rate at which a non-adopter hears 
about the innovation. The conformity model emphasizes individual thresholds that 
determine when a particular agent will adopt. Feedback effects exist because unique 
individual thresholds are expressed as a function of the proportion of the population that 
has already adopted. 
The model that most strongly emphasizes strategic interaction and feedback 
between group members is the social learning model. According to the social learning 
model, individuals are not simply concerned with the number of previous adopters. They 
are concerned with evidence and outcomes among previous adopters. Young makes a 
distinction between non-cumulative and cumulative learning models. In the cumulative 
learning model, the information generated by each prior adopter accumulates over time. 
In other words, in addition to taking into account the outcomes of the previous adopters, 
the cumulative learning model emphasizes that an individual considering adoption will 
also consider the length of time that the previous adopters have used the innovation. Non-
cumulative learning models are classified together with threshold models. Cumulative 
learning curves have the unique feature of initial deceleration. Young explains that 
“cumulative learning attaches a lot of weight to information generated by very early 
adopters, of which there are very few, which creates an initial drag on the process” (2007: 
19). Figure 5.1 shows a comparison of adoption curves generated by non-cumulative and 









Figure 5.1 Acceleration Patterns of Cumulative and Non-Cumulative Learning 
A comparison of the patterns of innovation diffusion caused by non-cumulative (top) and 




Because several of these models (in particular the cumulative social learning 
model) are driven by endogenous interaction, it is possible to conduct an initial analysis 
about whether strategic interaction has an effect on the founding rate of bioengineering 
departments. Furthermore, it is possible that this analysis will provide evidence not only 
of the existence of endogenous interaction in the population of bioengineering 
departments, but of a particular type of endogenous interaction. The contagion and 
conformity models can be classified as endogenous preference interaction. The social 
learning model can be classified as endogenous expectations interaction. There is an 
especially strong association between the learning model and expectations interaction. 
Endogenous expectations interaction is based on observational learning. 







Table 5.1 Acceleration Analysis Models 
 




In this table, 
! 
˙ ̇ p(t) indicates the rate of acceleration and 
! 
˙ ̇ p(t) / ˙ p (t)  indicates the 
relative rate of acceleration. In Young’s analysis, p(t) is the proportion of adopters at time 
t, where the clock is set so that p(0)=0. Therefore, 
! 
˙ ̇ p(0)  indicates the rate of acceleration 
at time t=0. The cumulative learning model is the only model in which 
! 
˙ ̇ p(0)  is less than 
zero. Also, this model has a relative rate of acceleration that is initially increasing. 
In order to compare the acceleration pattern of bioengineering department 
founding to the unique footprints of these models, I plotted the founding curve as a 
proportion and calculated the rate of acceleration and the relative rate of acceleration. A 









                    Figure 5.3 Bioengineering Department Founding: Relative Rate of Acceleration 
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Figure 5.3 shows a graph of the relative rate of acceleration,
! 
˙ ̇ p(t) / ˙ p (t) . Both 
Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 provide evidence that the acceleration pattern of bioengineering 
department founding matches the acceleration pattern of the cumulative learning model. 
This provides strong initial evidence that strategic interaction has affected the founding 
pattern of bioengineering departments. It also provides evidence that strategic interaction 
in this particular population leads to later adoption (rather than the early adoption 
predicted by Cournot competition). 
 An important implication of the first finding (that strategic interaction has an 
impact on the founding rate of bioengineering departments) is that the density variables 
used in the density dependence analysis earlier in the paper are most likely endogenous 
and, therefore, biased. This does not rule out the use of density as a variable in 









 This paper has shown that there is evidence of both density dependence and 
strategic interaction effects on the founding rate of bioengineering departments, but 
further research is needed to improve the validity and explanatory power of these models. 
The validity of the density dependence model is threatened by evidence of strategic 
interaction between actors, which implies that density is endogenous. The strategic 
interaction model is a simple tool for drawing initial observations about the factors that 
influence an innovation diffusion process. 
 Finding evidence of the effect of strategic interaction within the university 
bioengineering department population raises questions of other sources of strategic 
interaction that could influence the founding rate of the bioengineering population. The 
introduction of this paper notes the unique interdependence of organizations within high-
tech communities such as the bioengineering community. If social learning has had a 
significant effect on the founding rate of bioengineering departments, there is no reason 
to assume that learning only occurred by universities observing other universities. In 
short, Manski’s concern with researchers correctly identifying the group within which 
endogenous interaction takes place is relevant. 
 The density dependence analysis found Whitaker funding to be highly significant 
in explaining the founding rate of bioengineering departments. It is possible that the 
Whitaker Foundation also acted strategically; there is evidence in a quotation mentioned 
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earlier in the paper that the board of the Whitaker Foundation made the largest 
contributions to department foundings when they felt that the population was on the cusp 
of significant growth. If this is the case, the significance of Whitaker funding could be 
overestimated. This does not diminish the concern that Whitaker funding could contribute 
to the population of bioengineering departments overshooting its carrying capacity; it 
simply gives more weight to these concerns. It would be interesting to develop a model 
that analyzes both the effects of cumulative learning and Whitaker funding. 
Another issue in relation to funding by the Whitaker Foundation is the selection 
criteria that were used to make funding decisions. Even if the Whitaker Foundation 
would not disclose information about their specific selection process, it would be 
interesting to analyze whether there is a relationship between a school having an already-
established bioengineering program and receiving a grant. It should also be noted that the 
fact that some schools implemented programs before they established departments causes 
a selection issue in the founding analysis. If universities implement programs to gauge 
the potential success of a department, the universities that try and die out are selected out 
of the analysis of departments, and again, the positive effect of Whitaker is possibly 
overestimated. 
In spite of the limitations of this study, this paper makes an important argument 
that the use of the concept of competition in organizational ecology is limited, and 
presents evidence that strategic interaction influenced the pattern of bioengineering 
department founding. There is evidence that the strategic interaction that influenced the 
pattern of bioengineering department founding was the result of a cumulative learning 
process, which can also be referred to as endogenous expectations interaction. This 
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particular model of endogenous interaction is similar to density dependence because both 
predict that the initial founding process is very slow. In the density dependence 
explanation, this is due to the lack of legitimacy for the organizational form. Time is 
required to establish a sufficient base of legitimacy. In the cumulative learning model, the 
initial slow phase is due to the lack of information about adoption outcomes. Time is 
required to establish a sufficient base of information. Further analysis is necessary to 
draw a conclusion about which explanation has more empirical weight. 
Further research is also necessary to draw conclusions about the existence of 
strategic interactions and cumulative social learning in other populations. A population of 
universities might be more likely to be influenced by social learning than a population of 
firms would. Social learning is perhaps more pervasive in university environments, which 
are characterized by high turnover as former students of one university department often 
become professors at another university. Other forms of strategic interaction might be 
more prevalent in populations of firms. 
In summary, this paper is unique because it addresses both a population and a 
concept that have received little attention within organizational ecology. Populations of 
universities and university departments are not often studied, nor has organizational 
ecology’s conception of competition been thoroughly critiqued. The analysis conducted 
in study provides evidence that more detailed and robust comparisons of population 
ecology and strategic interaction are likely to yield important conclusions about the 
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